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UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP		Executive Registry	
		79-034	
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Administrative Officer, DCI		
2			
3	Director of Security		
4			
5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Attached are our comments on the Security Task Force Review.

B. C. Evans

B. C. Evans

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER	
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Executive Secretary	8 Jan 79
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FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions

(40)

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY
FILE # S-110

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT COMMENTS ON THE SECURITY
TASK FORCE REVIEW OF THE CIA SECURITY PROGRAM

The comments below are keyed to the recommendations contained in paragraphs 13 through 26, under the heading Information Control Security, pages 91 through 95:

- Para 13. Agree with this recommendation, however, we should wait until the [] Group issues their report before establishing another group to define which intelligence requires TOP SECRET classification and how best to account for the material.
14. Accountability, as described in this recommendation, is being accomplished in the Executive Registry now. Agree that other Directorates should account for and record destruction of classified documents and correspondence in the same manner.
15. Agree, if this is not already the case, however, rejustification should be every two years. A careful examination should be made as to the number of copies being reproduced and disseminated.
16. Disagree. This recommendation is unrealistic unless there are guidelines and/or regulations to consult. Otherwise each challenge will wind up as a personal opinion with the originator exercising overriding judgment.
17. Agree, however, there are two approaches (1) review of registry operations first and then prepare standardized operating procedures or (2) prepare regulations, manuals, etc., and then survey the registry operations for compliance. We prefer the latter and wish to participate actively in the review process.
18. Agree, but "central authority" needs to be defined. Registry employees should not be put in the position of having to serve two masters. If the intent is to establish uniform policy, procedures and guidelines, DDA should be able to provide these as they do in Records Management functions now. Additionally, to take the action recommended could make the information control function more visible and management could begin to focus on the resources spent for such activities on an Agency-wide basis.
19. Strongly agree with mandatory standardized training but the first order of business should be to establish Agency policy, update regulations, manuals, etc., then require classroom training.

25X

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20. Disagree. Creating a career service seems to run counter to DCI/DDCI desires to consolidate the number of career services. The goals desired also need to be defined and could probably be attained within the new clerical panel systems, if the review recommended in para 17 includes panel representatives and the career services and panels instructed to address personnel/security concerns relating to registry personnel. It seems imperative that solutions devised for security problems not create personnel problems. An integrated approach by OS and OP appears necessary. What is needed is central career planning, development and training of information control specialists. With proper training and broadening assignments these specialists should be able to move laterally from registry to registry anywhere within the Agency. It seems feasible that information control specialists be DDA careerists who are detailed to other components such as admin, personnel, and security specialists are now so detailed Agency-wide.
21. Agree with reservations. This is a sound security recommendation, however, while additional control over the xeroxing of material seems required, this approach seems to go too far in that direction and would interfere with the efficient operations of many offices.
22. Agree only with that portion of the recommendation dealing with transmitting classified documents from registry to registry. Document reading rooms seem impractical from three viewpoints: (1) current lack of space, (2) the lack of control over readers who will take notes on the document, thus providing no control of the sensitive information; and (3) the fact that analysts and operators need the material at their desks to work on.
23. Agree with an annual inventory of all TS and Compartmented documents.
24. Disagree. See no need for such other than an annual Audit/Inventory Team formed from all Directorates under Office of Security leadership, thus placing little personnel strain on any one office or Directorate. Additionally, self-inspections with an Office of Security developed checklist or guide could be used followed up by unannounced inspections on a periodic basis.
25. No comment.
26. No comment.

Executive Reg.

15-9918/15

4 December 1978

NOTE FOR: DCI

I think that this is a useful report,
although I have some problems with it. I have
asked Jack Blake to send copies to the Deputy
Directors for comment.

DD2 DEC 1978
DDCI

Good report

Carlucci

Attachment:
Report of the Security
Review Task Force

*My decisions annotated. Hold
implementation until you
review Deputy's comments -*

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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Personnel Security

1. It is recommended that the current CIA Regulation
[] be revised to:

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(a) Clearly charge individual supervisors in this Agency with basic responsibility for the security supervision of employees under their purview.

OK

(b) Require the appointment of one or more Career Security Officers to each major Agency component to assist Agency supervisors in fulfilling their security supervisory responsibilities.

OK - achieved
by [unclear]
attention
one person
per component
A replaced for

(c) Charge Career Security Officers with the responsibility of selecting Designated Security Officers in each component who, as their subordinates, will assist them in fulfilling their responsibilities, and that their selection be concurred in by both the component head and the Director of Security.

I believe
components
should select;
OS review &
comment

(d) Require that each Designated Security Officer undergo an appropriate period of training in the Office of Security before he assumes his duties.

OK

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(e) Include as the first two responsibilities of the Career Security Officer:

- OK
- (1) the establishment and maintenance of methods for becoming aware of significant personnel situations as a first priority; and
 - (2) the implementation of a CIA Security Awareness Program, as developed by the Office of Security, on a regular basis but no less than twice per year.

DDCI upon rec of this

2, It is recommended that the Director of Security be [^]authorized, in coordination with the heads of appropriate Agency components, to determine where he wishes to have Career Area Security Officers placed at Headquarters and in domestic and foreign installations; after which appropriate action will be taken to implement his determinations.

NOTE: Because of the time constraints placed upon the authors of this report, it is not possible at this time to state precisely how many new Career Security Officer positions would be required to implement this program. *Same technique as 1(B)*

3. It is recommended that a new group be established and properly staffed within the OS to include all indoctrination and education functions, patterned after the program in

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existence at NSA. The functions of the new group would include: EOD and exit briefings; serving as a focal point for consultation and channeling personnel problems to the proper components; guidance to employees regarding outside activities; briefings and debriefings prior to PCS/TDY overseas assignments, private travel and access to sensitive compartmented information; the establishment of an on-going security awareness program.

Presuming that some existing resources could be reallocated in establishing this group, it is estimated that approximately four to six new positions would be required to achieve comparability with the NSA program. *Go with existing ass DDC review + 4-6 in Cite Budget doc*


4. It is recommended that probationary employees be screened prior to becoming career employees by a combined review by their Career Service, OMS, OS, and OP. Such screening would include a review of fitness reports and supervisory comments and the recommendation of the Career Service and OP, an updating and review of medical records, and a reinvestigation and EOD-type polygraph by OS. It is anticipated that this recommendation would require additional personnel resources in OS, OMS, and OP. *OK But w/in existing resources*

5. It is recommended that a policy be adopted requiring that Industrial Contractor employees undergo an investigation

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to include verification of birth, the last or most significant employment, the present or most significant neighborhood and interviews with two character references and police checks. Additionally, a reinvestigation should be conducted every five years, to include, as a minimum, a review of the individual's company security and personnel files and a check of FBI records. OK



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Physical Security

7. In order to obtain a desired degree of compound access control, Gate #2 (West Lot) and Gate #3 (George Washington Parkway) should be restricted to badged employees only. All unbadged entry should be directed to Gate #1 (Route 123) where a visitor processing area would be developed. This area, to the right of Gate #1, should be examined by a traffic-design consultant in order to effect the desired level of control without significantly hindering the conduct of official business. The ultimate solution for this area should take into account the need to verify an individual's stated purpose for visiting the Agency. The processing area should be capable of handling, with an acceptable level of inconvenience, all

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categories of unbadged visitors. Special parking areas would be required in the immediate area and consideration should be given to a compound shuttle bus system to bring visitors to the Main Entrance after initial screening. Additionally, the use of temporary and permanent vehicle passes to facilitate the passage of frequent visitors should be considered during this study. OK

8. To provide for refined discrimination of fence alarm activity, equipment necessary for a significant reduction in individual zone length should be acquired and installed. OK



10. It is recommended that a complete review of all VNE badge holders be undertaken with the respective sponsoring offices. Procedural constraints on VNE badge issuance, such as sponsoring office justification memoranda and Office of Security review mechanisms, should be reassessed and significantly modified. The continuing responsibility of a sponsoring individual for a VNE badge holder must be clearly

OK
Plus - ZBB renew all VNE badges; delete all non-ZB personnel; reduce total by at least 50%.

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established and accepted. The reviewing role of the Office of Security must be affirmed and exercised. The categories of individuals presently holding VNE badges should be scrutinized, and any inappropriate category, such as IBM or Xerox maintenance personnel, changed to a proper badge.

OK 11. It is recommended that the technology of the Security Access Control System (SACS) and the Automated Alarm Monitor System (AAMS) be utilized to provide technical validation of a person seeking entry to a vault or secure area. This could be achieved by using the existing data stored in SACS and AAMS, together with data on the employee's badge. A special reader unit at the control door of each of the 300-plus storage areas would permit the authorized custodian to insert his/her badge and technically validate the entry.

UK 12. It is recommended that CIA institute a program for the selective and progressive elimination of all obsolete security container safe files from the Agency's inventory, beginning with those currently located at Agency facilities outside of the Headquarters Building. This should be funded by the Office of Logistics and carried out in an MBO format.

Information Control Security

13. It is recommended that the DCI appoint an action group to define precisely which intelligence requires TOP SECRET classification, both within and outside the compartmentation systems, and provide specific, detailed guidance

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with the intent of reserving TOP SECRET classification for information of truly extraordinary sensitivity and imposing strict accountability and rigid physical security upon those items determined to be TOP SECRET, both collateral and SCI. OK

14. It is recommended that strict accountability be imposed upon TOP SECRET SCI materials, identical to that required for noncompartmented TOP SECRET, but within compartmented channels. This should include TOP SECRET SCI electrical message traffic. 25X1

15. It is recommended that a zero-based review of the dissemination of sensitive intelligence reports and publications be conducted, to ensure that all subscribers have a true need for the materials they receive. It is further recommended that revalidation of these requirements be provided in January of each year, with approval certified first at the Branch and then at the Division level of the originating office. User profiles should be superimposed on the distribution of all intelligence publications to provide a need-to-know filter limiting the individual's topical access. Pre-printed covers for intelligence publications should reflect the actual classification and compartmentation of the material they cover. 0

16. It is recommended that procedures be established to permit readers to challenge serious anomalies in classification

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or compartmentation, requiring prompt reevaluation and response by the originator.

25X1

17. It is recommended that an intensive review of current registry operations, policies, procedures and requirements be undertaken.

OK

18. It is recommended that the responsibility for policy and procedural guidance of basic registry functions be removed from the individual components and placed under central authority.

7 DDCT

19. It is recommended that formal training in security document control procedures be made mandatory for all registry personnel and others assigned responsibility for controlling sensitive documents.

OK

20. It is recommended that a career service be created to include all registry officers and information control specialists.

7 DDCT

21. It is recommended that all office copiers and microform printers be located in registries or document control centers, to be operated only by information control specialists who will ensure that all copies of controlled documents are properly registered, controlled and stored.

OK

22. It is recommended that all controlled documents (TOP SECRET, SCI, etc.) be transmitted only from registry

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to registry, and that they be controlled and held in registry reading rooms, where they may be read by those requiring access. In fully justified cases, controlled documents might be charged out to individuals for brief periods, with prompt follow-up on documents not promptly returned. OK

23. To supplement Executive Order 12065, it is recommended that TOP SECRET intelligence documents, once defined as recommended previously, be inventoried annually, whether SCI or non-SCI. All Intelligence Community elements should initiate an ongoing program to spot-inventory controlled documents, whether held by individuals, components, or registries. OK
25X1

24. It is recommended that the Office of Security create a unit to conduct security audits of Agency components, similar to the recently-instituted Industrial Security Audits. This unit should also conduct spot inspections of controlled document holdings whether they be accountable to individuals, components, or registries. OK
Dec
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25. It is recommended that security requirements be included in ODP standards to enhance security control of classified data by need-to-know profiles for topical access to data; by utilizing user codes and ID numbers to access data; by creating audit trails for all data output, and by applying classifications, copy numbers and other controls to data output. It is further recommended that all Agency ADP systems be designed in accordance with ODP programming and production standards. 7
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26. It is recommended that a CIA component be given the responsibility to monitor technological advances in the ADP field for the eventual development of a central, formalized computer-operated document accountability system for registry use and for use at remote terminals.

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